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Abstract
We examine a two country aid model with performance intensive aid. The aid budget is determined by a
donor country legislature, but allocated by a donor agency in terms of a performance criterion of its choice. Five
sources of slippage in policy delivery are introduced: the donor agency observes the performance of the aid recipient
imperfectly; the donor agency and the aid recipient are subject to ineﬃciency; the aid recipient experiences corruption;
and adjustment of aid recipient performance is costly. Incentives between the aid donor and the aid recipient are
intentionally aligned - to explore the best-case for the policy intervention. Immediate implications are then that
optimal level of eﬀort and governance in the aid recipient increase under performance intensity of aid. Moreover,
performance intensity of aid has fundraising eﬀects. While the aid recipient also has an incentive to increase the
measurement noise in governance, this incentive is weaker than that to raise true underlying governance, is weakest
for the poorest aid recipients and provided that the donor agency is suﬃciently eﬃcient, measurement error itself will
serve to raise optimal eﬀort in the aid recipient. The importance of aid agency self-monitoring is thereby identiﬁed.
Three important qualiﬁcations on the anticipated success of the policy emerge, however. Despite the elimination of
incentive misalignment, aid donors may come to rely on performance intensity precisely where such a reliance is likely
to be least successful in aid recipients. Second, performance intensity of aid maximizes its impact under conditions
where it is supplemented by technical assistance to improve the eﬀectiveness of own eﬀort by the aid recipient.
Finally, under convex adjustment costs the general class of optimal time paths in governance in aid recipients will
be non-monotone, such that governance may get worse before they get better - optimally so. Performance intensive
policy may thus appear to fail - immediately after imposition.
Keywords: Aid, performance intensive policy measures, incentives.
JEL classiﬁcation: D81, D82, D90, E61, O19, O29.
1. Introduction
Calls for performance driven public management have increased. Recent applications of the principle
have emerged with respect to foreign aid tied to improved governance in aid recipient countries, state or
federal funding tied to test score performance of schools, proxies for quality of health care or short run health
indicators, and bonuses and incentive schemes in the public service provision of federal agencies.1
The suggestion sounds like sound economics. Tie rewards to the desired outcomes of the policy inter-
vention - align the incentives of the agents engaged in policy delivery with intended outcomes. But which
performance measures should one use? Are the desired incentive eﬀects likely to emerge? What happens if
desirable performance is diﬃcult to observe? Does lurking corruption threaten to derail the sound function-
ing of the incentive mechanism - and if so how severe is this eﬀect? Can the donor agencies that dispense
funds themselves come to distort the intended impact of performance intensity in policy intervention?
In this paper we consider these questions with reference to a relevant abstraction of the problem. The
example we detail is the allocation of foreign aid, but the reach of the analysis is more general, including
education policy, health policy, the provision of federal services.
In February 2003, President Bush sent Congress a bill to increase foreign aid by 50 percent over the next
three years by creating a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA provides an additional $5 billion
per year to a select group of poor countries, allocated on the basis of sound policies and honest governments.
∗School of Economics, University of Cape Town.
†President and University Professor, Claremont Graduate University
1The Volcker Commision calls for performance-driven public management. Klitgaard, Fedderke and Akramov (2004) ex-
amines in greater detail issues that arise from the choice of performance criteria. Fedderke, Klitgaard and Akramov (2004)
supplements with statistical evidence.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 2
To qualify for MCA funds, countries are rated on 16 indicators from a variety of sources.2 The requirement
is that a poor country score above the median on the anti-corruption indicator anda b o v et h em e d i a ni nh a l f
of the indicators in each of the three policy areas.
In both scale and design, the MCA has been called the ﬁrst major foreign aid initiative in more than
40 years (Radelet 2003a, 2003b). Its underlying logic is based on a growing recognition that aid can help
countries with good governance, but will make little diﬀerence in countries with bad governance. This is a
lesson of an inﬂuential book by David Dollar and Lance Pritchett (1998) and an article by Burnside and
Dollar (2000). Although more recent statistical studies question the robustness of their ﬁndings,3 it is now
commonly observed that good governance is important for development. And regardless of which way the
empirical evidence comes to settle, certainly USAID has linked aid to performance in governance - see USAID
(2002:33 and 51).
An abstract version of the problem examined by the paper posits three stages. A legislature (funder,
Congress say) speciﬁes an aid budget. This provides money to a donor agency (the executive),4 which decides
on the allocation criteria according to measures of performance among recipients. Finally, the donor agency
then allocates money across a variety of recipients (activities, agents, countries).
The paper explicitly considers the best-case scenario for performance intensive aid. Incentives between
the aid donor and the aid recipient are aligned - in the sense that both the aid donor and recipient are
concerned with the maximization of aid recipient income.5 Further, to exclude aid misallocation on the basis
of the strategic pursuit of aid recipients’ interests, the aid recipient is deemed to be incapable of inﬂuencing
the decisions of the aid donor.6 Implementation of performance intensive aid in the paper is not without its
constraints, however. Five sources of slippage in policy delivery are introduced: the donor agency observes
the performance of the aid recipient imperfectly; the donor agency and the aid recipient are subject to
ineﬃciency; the aid recipient experiences corruption; and adjustment of aid recipient performance is costly.
Given the speciﬁcation of the problem, it is unsurprising to ﬁnd that aid recipients have an incentive to
improve governance and growth-enhancing eﬀort, and that the aid donor has an incentive to increase aid
funding.
Equally unsurprising is that the aid recipient has an incentive to also increase the measurement noise in
2The following 16 indicators (with sources), were “chosen because of the relative quality and objectivity of their data, country
coverage, public availability, and correlation with growth and poverty reduction, will be used to assess national performance
relative to governing justly, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom”:
1. Governing Justly: Civil Liberties (Freedom House); Political Rights (Freedom House); Voice and Accountability (World
Bank Institute); Government Eﬀectiveness (World Bank Institute); Rule of Law (World Bank Institute); Control of
Corruption (World Bank Institute).
2. Investing in People: Public Primary Education Spending as Percent of GDP (World Bank/national sources); Primary
Education Completion Rate (World Bank/national sources); Public Expenditures on Health as Percent of GDP (World
Bank/national sources); Immunization Rates: DPT and Measles (World Bank/UN/national sources).
3. Promoting Economic Freedom: Country Credit Rating (Institutional Investor Magazine); Inﬂation (IMF); 3-Year Budget
Deﬁcit (IMF/national sources); Trade Policy (Heritage Foundation); Regulatory Quality (World Bank Institute); Days
to Start a Business (World Bank).
By early 2004 the Bush administration had identiﬁed 63 countries eligible to compete for the ﬁrst round of MCA funding
because their per capita income was below $1,415 and they were not deemed to be sponsors of terrorism.
3See for example Easterly et al (2004), and Hansen and Tarp (2000). Collier and Dollar (2002) provide further evidence
in support of the importance of governance, and see also the reply by Burnside and Dollar (2004). McGillivray (2004) lists 6
studies that ﬁnd that aid is more eﬀective under good governance, 26 studies that ﬁnd aid eﬀective irrespective of governance.
Gunning (2004) provides an overview of the debate.
4In what follows we treat the executive and the donor agency as interchangeable, though in general we employ the term donor
agency. This reﬂects our assumption that the donor agency is led by an executive authority that represents the decision-making
structure of the agency.
5Of course this is an abstraction - since it precludes the pursuit of geopolitical self-interest on the part of the donor. We
are concerned with the extent to which performance intensity of aid succeeds in achieving its stated objectives under the most
propitious conditions.
6This also has the advantage of realism. While there may be some recipients that have the capacity to aﬀect the donor
agency (Russia?, Brazil?), in the general case this is unlikely (Rwanda).Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 3
governance. On the other hand, what is notable is that the incentive to increase measurement noise is weaker
than the incentive to raise true underlying governance, and that the incentive to raise measurement noise
is likely to be weakest for the poorest aid recipients. Finally, provided that the donor agency is suﬃciently
eﬃcient, measurement error itself will serve to raise optimal eﬀort in the aid recipient.
A second useful insight of the paper is that despite circumstances that have eliminated any misalignment
of incentives between donors and aid recipients, aid donors may come to rely on performance intensity
precisely where such a reliance is likely to be least successful.
Third, performance intensity of aid maximizes its impact under conditions where it is supplemented by
technical assistance to improve the eﬀectiveness of own eﬀort by the aid recipient.
Finally, under convex adjustment costs the general class of optimal time paths in governance in aid
recipients will be non-monotone, such that governance may get worse before they get better - optimally so.
Performance intensive policy may thus appear to fail - immediately after imposition.
Section 2. presents a fuller account of the problem of the paper. In section 3. we brieﬂyd e r i v et h e
incentive and fundraising eﬀects of the policy intervention. Measurement error in governance is dealt with
in section 4. The reliance of donors on performance intensity where it is least likely to succeed is addressed
in section 5. Sections 6. and 7. deal with the impact of aid recipient own productivity and adjustment costs
in governance respectively, while section 8. concludes.
2. A Fuller Description of the Problem
Focus of the analysis which follows is on the impact of making a policy intervention conditional on per-
formance in some dimension speciﬁed by the legislature. In the case of foreign aid, providing aid conditional
on good governance.7
Consider a two-country case with donor country and recipient country. The aid granting country has two
agencies responsible for the provision of resources for aid (say Congress), and the allocation of aid respectively
(say the State Department, or USAID). In what follows, we term these two agencies the legislature or
Congress and the executive or donor agency respectively. The two agencies have split power in order to
prevent the pursuit of geo-politic self-interest on the part of the donor country.8 Eliminating the pursuit of
geo-politic interest in granting aid, assumes at the outset that the donor country really does pursue what
is most often cited as the purpose of granting foreign aid - maximizing the welfare (measured by income,
denoted Y ) of the aid recipient, subject to the cost of aid.9 We denote aid by k, the cost to the legislature by
CL (k), and for the sake of simplicity assume further that the cost of aid is simply the magnitude of the aid
granted.10 The aid budget is set by the legislature, for allocation by the donor agency. For instance, USAID
aid is part of the State Department’s budget, submitted by the President and approved by Congress.
The benevolent intention of the donor ensures that the incentives of the legislature and donor agency
are aligned with those of the aid recipient - making for the most propitious possible circumstances for the
policy intervention. Given that the policy intervention is such that aid is intended to be granted only where
the agent is indeed focussed on development (as indicated by good governance), this captures at least the
7We have found little guidance in the prior literature on this problem. Adam and O’Connell (1999) considers the impact of
aid on an economy in which there is a game between government and private sector. Aid can have a postive impact by lifting
the tax burden on the private sector - on condition that the government is suﬃciently representative (termed a "developmental
state" by Adam and O’Connell). Our concern is more directly with the nature of the relation between aid donor and aid
recipient - recognizing the existence of both executive and legislature in the donor country. Azam and Laﬀont (2003) is an
alternative that provides an analysis of aid in terms of contract theory.
8Separation of pwers is such as to preclude strategic interaction. The legislature delegates authority to the donor agency by
means of a charter for the donor agency that determines its authority and precludes the legislature from meddling. The charter
is a pre-commitment that is publicly observable, and not subject to re-negotiation. Given the low priority accorded to foreign
aid by the electorate of most developed countries, the bargaining power of the donor agency against the legislature on foreign
aid allocation would be circumscribed even if present.
9In doing so we suppress the possibility that aid may be an instrument by means of which strategic interest dictated by
realpolitische interests are pursued. Such motivation for aid is undoubtedly present in the consideration of aid donors - but it
is not the concern of our analysis.
10Thus any ﬁxed and variable cost of administration and transfer of aid is eﬀectively borne out of the aid budget itself.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 4
intention of the intervention. Aid is not granted unconditionally, however, but subject to a performance
criterion. The legislature determines the rule or criterion on which performance is to be measured (here
governance); the donor agency sets the intensity (denoted β) with which performance is rewarded.
The donor agency accepts its mandate as improving aid recipient country welfare without quibble, such
that donor agency utility will load purely on recipient country income Y , subject to the operational cost
of the donor agency, denoted CD. W ea s s u m eo p e r a t i o n a lc o s tc o n v e xi nt h ea d m i n i s t r a t i v eb u r d e no f
implementing performance intensity of aid. The donor agency also accepts unconditionally the injunction of
the legislature that aid should be conditional on the performance measure given by governance.11
Note that the implication is that the aid budget, k, becomes a function of the governance criterion chosen:
k = k(g). This is so for three reasons. Most straightforward is that where aid is tied to the governance
performance criterion, k = k(g), in the absence of time inconsistency in the commitment of the aid granting
country, the aid budget will have to respond to improved governance on the part of the recipient. We term
this the commitment eﬀect. The legislature may also value the performance measure chosen for its own sake.
For instance, the legislature may value good governance (democracy) in aid recipients for its own sake, as
a "moral good" worthy of support. Since the suggestion is that good governance in aid recipients enters
the utility function of the legislature as an explicit argument, we term this the own utility eﬀect. Finally a
likely reason for legislative interest in a governance performance measure is that aid recipients under sound
governance are more likely to employ the aid funds eﬀectively. Under sound governance, the aid recipient
is subject to separation of powers, transparent and accountable systems of government that render wastage
of funds less probable. The result is that every dollar of development aid will have a higher impact if we
condition it on good governance. Since this serves the ultimate goal of the aid, governance may also be
valued for what we term the developmental eﬀect.
Recipient country income depends on capital stock (denoted K), and its eﬀort in pursuing growth-friendly
policies, (denoted e). Eﬀort is not costless. The recipient country faces the cost function CR = CR (e),
presumed convex, CR,e > 0,C R,ee > 0. Aid introduces the possibility of raising recipient country income
beyond that feasible given capital stock and own eﬀort. We treat aid as a direct transfer payment to the aid
recipient, rather than as an addition to recipient country capital stock, such that aid is additively separable
from the capital-eﬀort production function of the aid recipient.12 The motivation here is purity of analytical
purpose, as well as realism given the increasing tendency to provide aid in the form of ﬁnancial rather than
physical capital, disbursed at the discretion of the recipient, though not without conditionality.13
Motivation for the adoption of the performance criterion in aid is to maximize the impact of aid on
recipient country income. The objective is not only to increase recipient country income by the direct
transfer (the impact of k on Y ), but to improve the intensity of the eﬀort of the recipient country in
pursuing growth friendly policy (increasing e, in order to raise Y ). To the aid donor eﬀort is not directly
observable. For this reason, the aid donor country chooses a measure, in this instance governance (denoted
g), that it believes to be functionally related to the underlying eﬀort that it really wishes to stimulate.14
Justiﬁcation for the adoption of such an indirect measure rests on the presumption that the observation of
a change in the indirect measure, governance, must perforce be a reﬂection of a change in the underlying
11A modelling question concerns why the model below separates the legislature from the executive, rather than conﬂating
them into the donor. One reason is that it allows for clearer separation of the commitment eﬀect, from the own utility and
developmental eﬀects. Under circumstances where the latter two are not relevant, the analysis below stands, but the donor
country can be treated simply as the donor agency.
12To avoid confusion: note that k and K are therefore not related, except insofar as they both add to recipient country
output.
13The discussion in Easterly (2001:ch6) provides context, including warnings against expectations of panacea from the new
aid structure. Where aid comes in the form of additions to physical capital stock, too often the conditionality of the grant serves
to render the aid largely ineﬀective. Inappropriate and unsustainable giant steel mills, expensive and largely unread research
reports by donor coutnry development experts provide examples. See also the discussion in Stein (1992).
14The presentation of the MCA by USAID quoted in the introduction of this paper makes explicit that the objective of the
conditioning aid on governance is not the good governance for its own sake. It is that it is an indicator of sound underlying
growth-enhancing policy. We employ “performance” intensity, even though governance is not the intended performance target,
eﬀort. A more accurate terminology would be “proxy performance intensity,” which we do not employ. One reason is parsimony
of terminology - another that our concern is with the analysis of performance measures that are indirect, but are nevertheless
tied to the ﬁnal performance target (however imperfectly).Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 5
eﬀort dimension.15 Speciﬁcally, g = g(e),a n db o t hdg = gede,a n ddg ≷ 0 if de ≷ 0 strictly.16
Implementation of policy is seldom without ﬂaw, often for systematic reasons. We introduce imperfection
in policy implementation, termed policy slippage, through four distinct mechanisms.
The ﬁrst we have already encountered. Aid donors face information asymmetries. Eﬀort of aid recipients
cannot be observed directly. Instead, we have a proxy indicator, governance, g, which is an imperfect measure
of eﬀort subject to the error ε.17 Performance intensity of aid is tied to the observable dimension rather
than the unobservable underlying eﬀort. This creates an incentive for aid recipients to generate positive
measurement error, such that observed governance changes may now be due to dg = gede + dε, rather than
just changes in underlying eﬀort. Generation of measurement error by the aid recipient is not costless,
however, with CR (e,ε) convex in ε, CR,ε > 0,C R,εε > 0.
Second, aid recipients face a separate information asymmetry. The performance intensity of aid is itself
subject to some degree of uncertainty. This arises since bureaucratic ineﬃciency may generate both over-
and under-adjustment of aid in response to governance changes. The focus here is on policy slippage that
is randomly distributed (since systematic ineﬃciency could be rationally learnt or anticipated). Thus the
aid recipient observes β denotes the true underlying performance intensity of aid, subject to stochastic
disturbance, μ ∼ iid
¡
0,σ2
μ
¢
.
Third, the provision of aid resources may be diverted from the ﬁnal income of the recipient country
through corruption, with only some proportion, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, of the aid, k, granted reaching the ﬁnal income
of the recipient country, with the rest being diverted into the coﬀers of corrupt oﬃcials in the distribution
channels of the aid process.18 Improvements in governance, since they may lead to increases in accountability
and transparency, may lower the opportunity for corruption. We assume lowered corruption returns to
improved governance to be subject to diminishing returns, such that φ(g), φg > 0, φgg < 0.
Fourth, we have already noted that the income of the aid recipient depends on the eﬀort it puts into the
pursuit of growth friendly policy. The problem is that sound eﬀort/policy does not always prove eﬀective in
stimulating growth. Eﬀort has to be productively deployed also. Poor productivity of eﬀort may be due to the
absence of sound institutions other than those related to governance - for instance, sound ﬁnancial market or
commercial institutions, poor access to international capital markets, ineﬃcient domestic market structure,
perhaps low levels of social capital.19 We capture this by means of an eﬀort productivity parameter, δ.
While eﬀort productivity is likely to reﬂect a range of institutional determinants such as those listed above,
the quality of governance may also exert an inﬂuence. The empirical growth literature has suggested that
the impact of policy intervention on output is improved under conditions of good governance.20 Thus we
15There is an alternative attractive at ﬁrst blush. If the performance measure is indirect, the ﬁnal objective of aid, recipient
output, seems a plausible candidate. Unfortunately recipient country output has a multivariate determination, and the link
between aid and output is tenous (output may fall or rise due to exogenous shocks unrelated to eﬀort on the part of the recipient
-eg. climatic shocks). Further, even relatively large changes in aid budgets may be diﬃcult to detect statistically in an aggregate
measure such as GDP. For these reasons the performance measure is constrained to the indirect measure of the unobservable
input that is the objective of the incentive mechanism.
16Source of the mapping is left moot here. Our understanding is in the spirit of correlates, rather than causes. One
interpretation is that good governance leads to an enabling environment under which eﬀort is rewarded, hence acting as
stimulus. An alternative is that strong eﬀort will devote itself to the maintenance of sound governance as well as output. The
functional representation of the text is in the spirit of the latter interpretation. An analogy from education is the use of a
performance measure in the form of standardized test scores, as a means of stimulating underlying teacher eﬀort. Such questions
are the subject of an extensive empirical literature. For a recent examination of methodological issues involved, see Fedderke,
Klitgaard and Akramov (2004).
17In the current context, we concern ourselves only with the question of whether governance is a reliable measure of eﬀort.
Error, ε, is due strictly to the imperfect link between governance and eﬀort. It does not for instance represent a draw of a
speciﬁc type of aid recipient, imperfectly observed. A separate valid concern is whether governance itself is reliably measured
across countries. Concern about the reliability and validity of measures is expressed in Bollen (1991) and Inkeles (1991). The
work of Kaufman et al (1999a, 1999b, 2002) has concerned itself with redress. See also the discussion in Klitgaard and Fedderke
(1995) and Fedderke, Klitgaard and Akramov (2004).
18Note that the corrupt oﬃcials could be located either in the recipient or in the donor country distribution channels. Reality
is likely to be some combination of the two, and the model allows for this. The crucial point is that the aid ﬂow is diverted
from the income of the aid recipient country. Swiss bank accounts are the obvious alternative destination.
19The distinction from the ﬁrst form of slippage above is that in the present case good governance is ar e ﬂection of sound
eﬀort, whereas in the ﬁrst form of slippage good governance does not necessarily reﬂect sound eﬀort.
20The suggestion comes from Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett (1997) who ﬁnd that the impact of World Bank projects isPerformance Intensive Policy Intervention 6
have δ(g), subject to the standard concavity assumption, δg > 0, δgg < 0.
To summarize our discussion thus far, we have:
Y = Y (e,K,k,δ,φ),Y e > 0,Y ee < 0,Y K > 0,Y KK < 0,Y k > 0,Y δ > 0,Y φ > 0
CR = CR (e,ε),C R,e > 0,C R,ee > 0,C R,ε > 0,C R,εε > 0
g = g (e,ε),g e > 0,g ee =0 ,g ε > 0,g εε =0
δ = δ (g),δ g > 0,δ gg < 0
φ = φ(g),φ g > 0,φ gg < 0
k = F + k (g,β,μ),k F =1 ,k FF =0 ,k g > 0,k gg =0
CD = CD (β),C D,β > 0,C D,ββ > 0 (1)
where we adopt the convention of denoting constants by overbars. Hence aid that is not performance intensive
is taken to be ﬁxed, F.21 For the sake of analytical traction, and in the absence of compelling evidence to
the contrary, we also impose YeK = Yek = Yke = YgK = YKk = kFg =0 .22
We conclude the discussion of this section by clarifying the conceptual structure of the model. The
model precludes the possibility of strategic action by the donor agency against the legislature, and of the
aid recipient against the donor agency. Speciﬁcally, the aid recipient has no ability to have the aid donor
agency alter β, and strict institutional separation of power between the donor agency and the legislature,
ensures the independence of the legislature from strategic action on the part of the donor agency. Under
these conditions the solution of the problem is Stackleberg. The aid recipient will make its choice of the
optimal level of governance in response to an announcement of performance intensity of aid in governance,
in the knowledge that it cannot alter the behaviour of the aid donor. The donor agency may thus make its
choice in setting the optimal performance intensity of aid, treating the choice the aid recipient will make
with respect to governance as given. Symmetrically, the legislature can treat the optimal choice of the aid
donor as given in choosing the optimal size of the aid budget. Figure 1 illustrates.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
2.1. Detailing the Decision Problems
Objective of the aid recipient is to maximize its own income, subject to the cost of eﬀort. Since (some
of) the governing elites in the aid recipient may be intent to appropriate aid for personal gain, corruption
introduces a source of friction into the pursuit of the aid recipient country objective - without entirely
subverting the maximization of income. This gives us the decision problem for the recipient country:
max
e,ε V [e,ε]=
Z T
0
[Y (e,K,k,δ,φ) − CR (e,ε)]exp[−ρRt]dt (2)
where ρR denotes the recipient time rate of discount, and subject to relevant boundaries. We allow for eﬀort
and ε-measurement error as state variables.23
We proceed under the assumption of a benevolent aid donor country, interested in increasing recipient
country income. Recall that we postulated that the donor country had two institutions: the donor agency
responsible for setting the degree of performance intensity of aid (β), and the legislature responsible for
determining the magnitude of the aid granted and the criterion for performance intensity (g). The decision
problem for the donor agency in setting β is the trade oﬀ between the increased recipient country income
improved under conditions of good governance. Fedderke, Klitgaard and Akramov (2004) and Fedderke, Klitgaard and Dutta
(2004) both present more extensive and generalized statistical treatments of the point.
21Note that the ﬁxed component of aid could also be thought of as aid employed for geo-political interests, rather than for
the purpose of increasing aid recipient welfare.
22Note that while the marginal eﬀect of aid is thus independent of the level of eﬀort, in equilibrium there will be a relationship
between eﬀort and the marginal eﬀect of aid.
23Capital stock may constitute an additional state, subject to recipient country intervention. Our abstraction is motivated
by our focus on the link between governance and aid. In addition, capital and foreign direct investment are often constraints
in developing nations, particularly those who are the intended targets of aid ﬂows.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 7
under the aid award formula the donor had committed to, and the cost of the aid provided from the donor
perspective. The donor agency makes its decision in the knowledge that only β + μ is observed as signal
by the aid recipient, and it is equally aware that governance is an imperfect measure of underlying eﬀort,
g = g(e,ε). The donor agency is thus able to respond to information concerning changes in the eﬃciency of
aid delivery from donor to recipient, dμ, or in the accuracy of the governance measure, dε, though it does
not know the precise value that either μ,o rε,a s s u m e si nt h ec a s eo fa n ys p e c i ﬁc recipient. Provided the
assumption of benevolence in the aid donor agency is satisﬁed, the donor decision problem is then to:24
max
β
W [β]=
Z T
0
[Y (e,K,k,δ,φ) − CD (β)]exp[−ρAt]dt (3)
where ρA denotes the donor time rate of discount, and subject to relevant boundaries.
It now remains to detail the decision faced by the ﬁnal budget granting authority - the legislature
(Congress say). The objective is to maximize the income of the aid recipient by the aid k granted, subject
to the cost of granting aid, and recognizing that the performance measure, in this instance governance, may
itself be a source of utility to the legislature. This gives the decision problem for the legislature:
max
k
U [k]=
Z T
0
U (Y,g,k)exp[−ρLt]dt (4)
with ρL representing the legislature’s time rate of discount, and U = U (Y,g,k) the legislature’s utility
function, such that UY > 0, UYY < 0, Ug > 0, Ugg < 0, Uk < 0, Ukk < 0.25
Use of a ﬁnite time horizon reﬂects the recognition of limited terms of oﬃce of administrations in leading
donor countries, such that policy governing the provision of aid is subject to review and change after each
term of oﬃce of the legislature in the donor country. Given the change in policy direction in the donor
country with a change in administration (including whether aid is rendered performance intensive at all),
optimization by the aid recipient in response to the performance target set, is over the term of oﬃce that
the administration in the donor country holds.26
2.2. First Order Conditions
Given the decision problem of the aid recipient, deﬁned in terms of the two choice variables eﬀort (e) and
measurement slippage, (ε), the Euler equation ﬁrst order conditions for an extremal provide:

∂Y
∂e
−
∂CR
∂e

 ~} 
net direct
marginal
return
on effort
+
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g
∂g
∂e
 ~} 
marginal impact
of effort; through
governance induced
aid
+
∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g
∂g
∂e
 ~} 
marginal impact
of effort; through
governance induced
productivity of effort
+
∂Y
∂φ
∂φ
∂g
∂g
∂e
 ~} 
marginal impact
of effort; through
governance induced
corruption reduction
=0 (5)
−
∂CR
∂ε  ~} 
marginal cost
of measurement
slippage
+
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g
∂g
∂ε
 ~} 
marginal impact
of measurement
slippage;
through governance
induced aid
+
∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g
∂g
∂ε
 ~} 
marginal impact
of measurement
slippage;
through productivity
of effort
+
∂Y
∂φ
∂φ
∂g
∂g
∂ε
 ~} 
marginal impact
of measurement
slippage;
through corruption
=0 (6)
24We introduce recipient country income directly into the objective functional of the problem. An extension would be to a
von Neumann - Morgenstern utility formulation, though the core structure of the decision problem emerges also in our simpler
formulation.
25In the analysis which follows, unless its omission creates confusion, we supress the subscript on the time rate of discount.
26The term of oﬃce relevant to the optimization problem might be longer than the term of oﬃce held by a particular
administration, to the extent that there is policy continuity. An extension of the present model would be to treat the optimization
problem under inﬁnite time horizons, with subjective transition probabilities of switiching between alterative aid regimes held
by the aid recipient. On the other side of the decision problem, future aid granted by the donor agency may be contingent on
past performance of aid recipeints even under alternative aid policy regimes - which would be relevant to the decision problem
of the aid recipient. Here we abstract from the added complexity these extensions introduce.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 8
Here
¡∂Y
∂e − ∂CR
∂e
¢
denotes the net direct marginal return on the change in eﬀort undertaken to induce
governance changes; ∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g denotes the marginal impact of governance-induced aid changes on output; ∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g
denotes the marginal impact of governance-induced eﬀort productivity changes on output; ∂Y
∂φ
∂φ
∂g denotes the
marginal impact of governance-induced lowered corruption on output. Given
h
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g + ∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g + ∂Y
∂φ
∂φ
∂g
i
∂g
∂e,
all three indirect marginal eﬀects are ultimately driven through the aid-induced impact on eﬀort.
The indirectness of the performance measure oﬀers the aid recipient the opportunity to respond not
only through eﬀort, but by increasing the noise that inheres in the governance proxy of underlying eﬀort.
Such a response is subject to a marginal cost, −∂CR
∂ε , but to the extent that
∂g
∂ε > 0, the three marginal
eﬀects noted in conjunction with the recipients’ eﬀort response are again present. The consequence is that
the performance intensity of aid has the consequence not only of raising the “true” underlying target, aid
recipient eﬀort, but of raising governance measures independently of eﬀort, since all three marginal eﬀects
are also driven through measurement slippage induced governance changes.
Given the Stackleberg native of the model, the donor agency knows g∗, hence its responsiveness to the
donor agency’s choice of β. The Euler equation ﬁrst order condition for an extremal in β then provides:

∂Y
∂e
∂e
∂g
∂g
∂β
−
∂CD
∂β

 ~} 
n e te ffo r ti n d u c e dr e t u r n
on performance
intensity of aid
+
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g
∂g
∂β
 ~} 
fundraising
effect
+
∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g
∂g
∂β
 ~} 
impact
of performance
intensity of aid
on productivity
of effort
+
∂Y
∂φ
∂φ
∂g
∂g
∂β
 ~} 
impact
of performance
intensity of aid
on corruption
=0 (7)
such that
³
∂Y
∂e
∂e
∂g
∂g
∂β − ∂CD
∂β
´
represents the net marginal impact of increased recipient country output due
to the incentive eﬀect of the performance intensity of aid; ∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g represents the marginal fundraising eﬀect
of increased recipient country governance in response to the performance intensity of aid; ∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g denotes
the marginal impact of governance-induced eﬀort productivity changes on output; and ∂Y
∂φ
∂φ
∂g denotes the
marginal impact of governance-induced lowered corruption on output.
Implication of (7) is that the optimal choice of performance intensity of aid by the benevolent donor
agency will exhaust all means of raising recipient country income - by exploiting the incentive eﬀect that
emanates from the performance intensity of aid, by exploiting the fundraising eﬀect that it can exert on
the budget setting organization (legislature) in the donor country, as well as the productivity of eﬀort and
corruption channels. Symmetrically, from (5) and (6) the optimizing aid recipient will similarly exploit all
income opportunities from eﬀort and governance noise.
Further, given the Stackleberg structure of our problem, the legislature is able to take both the behaviour
of the aid recipient in choosing g∗ and the behaviour of the donor agency in choosing β
∗ as given. The ﬁrst
order condition given by the Euler equation is now:
∂U
∂Y
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g
∂g
∂e
∂e
∂β
 ~} 
commitment effect :
marginal utility
of effort
impact of aid
+
∂U
∂g
~}
own utility effect &
development effect :
marginal utility
of improved
governance
 ~} 
source of fundraising effect
+
∂U
∂Y
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂F  ~} 
marginal utility
of directaid
impact
+
∂U
∂k ~}
marginal disutility
of aid cost
=0 (8)
with ∂U
∂Y
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g
∂g
∂e
∂e
∂β capturing the marginal utility of budgetary expenditure on aid through changes in eﬀort
on the part of the aid recipient, ∂U
∂Y
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂F identiﬁes the marginal utility of the direct impact of aid on
recipient country income, ∂U
∂g the marginal utility of improved recipient country governance on the donorPerformance Intensive Policy Intervention 9
legislature, and ∂U
∂k the marginal disutility of the aid cost. Jointly, ∂U
∂Y
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g
∂g
∂e
∂e
∂β and ∂U
∂g are the source of
the fundraising eﬀect of aid.27 Respectively they are the commitment developmental, and own utility eﬀects
we noted at the outset of section 2..
3. Incentive and Fundraising Eﬀects
Given the structure of the problem, there are two immediate, and unsurprising bit of good news for the
performance intensive policy intervention: growth enhancing eﬀort in the aid recipient increases; and there
exists a fund-raising eﬀect of the policy intervention.
In particular, it follows from (5) that:
Proposition 1 (Eﬀort Incentives) In the presence of performance intensive aid allocation, the optimizing
recipient country will increase eﬀort and governance.
Proof. Under performance intensive aid, from (5):
µ
∂g
∂e
¶
PIA
=
−
¡∂Y
∂e − ∂CR
∂e
¢
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g + ∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g + ∂Y
∂φ
∂φ
∂g
where (∂g/∂e)PIA denotes the marginal governance eﬀect of eﬀort under performance intensive aid. Since
under aid that is not performance intensive ∂k/∂g =0by construction, |(∂g/∂e)PIA| < |(∂g/∂e)FA| where
(∂g/∂e)FA denotes aid that is not performance intensive. Given gee < 0,e ﬀort and governance under
performance intensive aid has increased.
Thus, to the extent that the aid recipient responds to the indirect performance measure by raising
eﬀort, aid ﬂows will increase and its output will rise. The improved governance may serve to increase the
eﬀectiveness of aid - by improving recipient country eﬀort, by lowering corruption, and by improving own
eﬀort productivity. To the extent that improved governance delivers the transparency and accountability
that allow for less wastage in the delivery of the aid ﬂows,
∂φ
∂g > 0, and hence each dollar of aid would be
more eﬀective in raising recipient country income (since less is siphoned oﬀ to private oﬀshore holdings).
The indirect eﬀect through eﬀort productivity is of particular signiﬁcance.28 Where improved governance
improves the productivity of own eﬀort (∂δ
∂g > 0), an additional benevolent impact on ﬁnal recipient country
output is opened up by the performance intensive aid, (∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g
∂g
∂e).
The fundraising eﬀect arises immediately from the postulated utility function of the donor country leg-
islature.
Proposition 2 (Fundraising Eﬀect) The optimal budget allocation, k∗, rises under performance inten-
sive aid.
Proof. From (8), where aid is not performance intensive, ∂k/∂g =0 , such that the relevant ﬁrst order
condition requires that the marginal disutility of aid be set equal to the marginal utility of the direct aid
impact, ∂U
∂k = ∂U
∂Y
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂F . Under performance intensive aid, (8) illustrates directly that a greater disutility of
aid can be countenanced, such that ∂U
∂k = ∂U
∂Y
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g
∂g
∂e
∂e
∂β + ∂U
∂g + ∂U
∂Y
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂F . Hence ∂k∗
∂g > 0.
27Note that the fundraising eﬀect is not conditional on the presence of g in the utility function of the legislature. The
eﬀort-contingent impact suﬃces to generate a endogeneity in the budget.
28The analysis which follows demonstrates the signiﬁcance of the ∂δ
∂g > 0 condition. See Propositions 8 through ??.T h e
irony is that it is non-trivial to isolate it empirically. We have already noted the Dollar and Pritchett (1998) argument that
it is indeed the case that ∂δ
∂g > 0, but equally the sketicism voiced by Easterly et al (2004). The analysis of Propositions 8
through ?? demonstrates tht the estimation diﬃculties may arise from the presence of strong non-linearities that are often
dealt with poorly by standard estimators. Fedderke, Klitgaard and Akramov (2004) and Fedderke, Klitgaard and Dutta (2004)
demonstrate the methodological estimation issues that require resolution in order to isolate that indeed ∂δ
∂g > 0, and strongly
so in economic terms.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 10
The implication is intuitive and immediate. Where the aid distributing policy intervention is rigorously
a n dc r e d i b l ya s s o c i a t e dw i t hp e r f o r m a n c ei n t e n s i t y, the aid budget becomes endogenous. The optimal aid
budget from the perspective of the legislature setting the budget may increase as the aid recipient responds
to the incentive to increase performance. Policy intervention that is performance intensive is thus associated
with a fundraising eﬀect, increasing the resources available for the policy intervention.
4 . T h eI m p a c to fN o i s ei nG o v e r n a n c e
When aid rewards governance rather than growth enhancing eﬀort, one means of increasing aid ﬂows is
to increase the noisiness with which governance measures underlying eﬀort.
Should the aid donor care?
The immediate answer is, of course: the optimizing aid recipient will increase eﬀort (see proposition 1),
but also noise in governance, and only the ﬁrst of these is desired.
Proposition 3 (Measurement Error Incentive I) In the presence of performance intensive aid alloca-
tion, the optimizing recipient country will increase governance measurement noise.
Proof. Under performance intensive aid, from (6):
µ
∂g
∂ε
¶
PIA
=
∂CR
∂ε
∂Y
∂k
∂k
∂g + ∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g + ∂Y
∂φ
∂φ
∂g
where (∂g/∂ε)PIA denotes the marginal governance eﬀect of noise under performance intensive aid. Since
under aid that is not performance intensive ∂k/∂g =0by construction, |(∂g/∂ε)PIA| < |(∂g/∂ε)FA| where
(∂g/∂ε)FAdenotes aid that is not performance intensive. Given gεε < 0, governance noise under performance
intensive aid has increased.
But the negative unintended consequence of the performance intensive policy intervention are of con-
strained importance. First, unless the relative cost of measurement error is dramatically smaller than that
of eﬀort, the fact that eﬀort has a direct productivity impact on physical capital ensures that the relative
return from eﬀort is stronger than on measurement error.
Proposition 4 (Measurement Error Incentive II) The incentive to raise measurement error is weaker
than the incentive to raise eﬀort, in the sense that the optimizing recipient country will ensure
∂g
∂ε >
∂g
∂e,
provided only that the relative marginal cost of eﬀort and measurement error, (∂CR/∂e − ∂CR/∂ε),a r en o t
strongly divergent.
Proof. From (5) and (6):
∂g
∂e
/
∂g
∂ε
=
µ
∂CR
∂e
−
∂Y
∂e
¶
/
∂CR
∂ε
S 1
for
∂Y
∂e
T
∂CR
∂e
−
∂CR
∂ε
Given gee < 0, gεε < 0,
∂g
∂e <
∂g
∂ε for (∂CR/∂e − ∂CR/∂ε) → 0,a n d
∂g
∂e >
∂g
∂ε for (∂CR/∂e − ∂CR/∂ε) →∞ .
For ∂CR/∂e ≈ ∂CR/∂ε,
∂g
∂e <
∂g
∂ε.
Crucial here is that measurement error has no direct positive impact on output - unlike underlying
productive eﬀort. The consequence is that unless the marginal cost of increasing measurement error lies
signiﬁcantly below that of increasing eﬀort, the positive output impact of eﬀort provides an added incentive
to raise eﬀort more than noise.
For the sake of further analytical traction on our problem, suppose that (1) is satisﬁed under:Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 11
Y (e,K,k,δ,φ)=eδKα + φk, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1,e≥ 1, (9)
CR (e)=θe+ λe2 + ϑε + ξε2, θ,λ,ϑ,ξ>0, (10)
k = F + bg, b > 0, (11)
= F +( β + μ)g, β + μ ≥ 0,μ∼ iid
¡
0,σ2
μ
¢
(12)
g = eε, ε ∼ iid
¡
1,σ2
ε
¢
(13)
CD = γβ + ψβ
2,γ , ψ>0 (14)
satisfying the restrictions on functional form noted above. The speciﬁcation of (13) presupposes the normal-
ization of eﬀort on minimum feasible eﬀort, which we might think of as a baseline or subsistence contribution.
The δ-parameter measures the eﬀectiveness of recipient eﬀort in improving output. The direct eﬀectiveness
of aid in increasing recipient income, independently of the incentive eﬀects of aid, is captured by the φ-
parameter.29 Note that dφ > 0 denotes a decrease in corruption, and hence an increased eﬀectiveness of
aid delivery. Convexity of the recipient cost function in eﬀort is assured by the λ,ξ-parameterization. The
illustration suppresses both δ (g) and φ(g).J u s t i ﬁcation rests on the analytical focus of the exposition. Since
the aid donor wishes to improve growth-related eﬀort on the part of the aid recipient, the indirect payoﬀs
through lowered corruption and improved productivity of recipient eﬀort are unintended though potentially
welcome impacts, not the primary policy channel. The analysis which follows nevertheless considers the im-
pact of both dδ and dφ, from which the likely consequences of any impact of governance on either dimension
can be inferred if required.
This gives us the decision problem for the recipient country:
max E {V [e,ε]} =
] T
0
E [Y (e,K,k,δ,φ) − CR (e)]exp[−ρt]dt (15)
=
] T
0
E
k
eδKα + φ

F +( β + μ)eε

− θe− λe2 − ϑε − ξε2
l
exp[−ρt]dt
where E denotes the mathematical expectations operator. The Euler equation ﬁrst order condition for the
a i dr e c i p i e n tf o ra ne x t r e m a li ne ﬀort is then:
δeδ−1Kα + φ
µ
β +
Z
μfμ (μ)dμ
¶Z
εfε (ε)dε − θ − 2λe =0 (16)
where fμ (μ) and fε (ε) denote the probability density functions of μ,ε, respectively. Consider the special
case in which δ =1 , such that we have increasing returns provided only that α>0 (we consider 0 ≤ δ<1
below). This provides the optimal solution in eﬀort, and by inference in governance for the developing
country:30
E {e∗} =
φ
¡
β +
R
μfμ (μ)dμ
¢R
εfε (ε)dε + Kα − θ
2λ
(17)
=
φβ + Kα − θ
2λ
for μ∼
¡
0,σ2
μ
¢
,ε∼
¡
1,σ2
ε
¢
E {g∗} = E {e∗}
Z
εfε (ε)dε
=
φ
¡
β +
R
μfμ (μ)dμ
¢£R
εfε (ε)dε
¤2 +( Kα − θ)
R
εfε (ε)dε
2λ
(18)
=
φβ
¡
1 − σ2
ε
¢
+( Kα − θ)
2λ
for μ∼
¡
0,σ2
μ
¢
,ε∼
¡
1,σ2
ε
¢
29Linearity of Y in k in expression (9) may appear to violate our introductory remarks. Since we have a single aid recipient,
the need to exclude linearity is now absent, since all aid will of necessity be allocated to the single recipient.
30Note that since
∂E{e∗}
∂β > 0,
∂E{g∗}
∂β > 0, proposition 1 certainly holds.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 12
The decision problem of the aid recipient includes the choice of measurement error in the link between
eﬀort and governance. This occurs where the aid recipient can change governance independently of eﬀort.
Under such circumstances from the Euler equation ﬁrst order condition for an extremal in measurement
error (ε) under substitution of (17) we have:
E {ε∗} =
φ
¡
β +
R
μfμ (μ)dμ
¢
E {e∗} − ϑ
2ξ
(19)
∴ E {ε∗} =
φ
¡
β +
R
μfμ (μ)dμ
¢
(Kα − θ) − 2ϑλ
4λξ − φ
2 ¡
β +
R
μfμ (μ)dμ
¢2 (20)
Provided the recipient country chooses the optimal level of eﬀort given the aid incentives (see 17), and
for the case of δ =1(again we consider 0 ≤ δ<1 below), this provides the donor with the decision:
max E {W [β]} =
] T
0
E

Kα + φ

β +
]
μfμ (μ)dμ
]
εfε (ε)dε

E {e∗} + φF − γβ − ψβ2

exp[−ρt]dt (21)
with ρ denoting the relevant donor time rate of discount, again subject to relevant boundaries, and with
the ﬁnite time horizon reﬂecting the relevant planning horizon of the incumbent administration. The Euler
equation ﬁrst order condition for an extremal in β provides the optimal performance intensity of aid:
E {β∗} =
φ(θ − 2Kα)
U
εfε (ε)dε − 2φ2 U
μfμ (μ)dμ
U
εfε (ε)dε
2 +2 λγ
2φ2 U
εfε (ε)dε
2 − 4λψ
(22)
The combination of (18) and (22) then allows us to identify the governance level that will be realized in the
recipient country.
For the sake of analytical clarity, it is useful to consider the case in which donor agency cost is ﬁxed,
CD, instead of convex in performance intensity, β.T h e s i m p l i ﬁcation aids tractability, though we treat
the implications of convex donor agency cost explicitly where they impact. Under ﬁxed donor agency cost
optimal performance intensity of aid reduces to:
E {β
∗} =
θ − Kα
2φ
R
εfε (ε)dε
−
Z
μfμ (μ)dμ (23)
A number of immediate implications follow that suggest that while there may exist a governance noise
response to the performance intensity of aid, this is of limited signiﬁcance from the perspective of the aid
donor.
First, poor aid recipients are least likely to respond by increasing governance noise, or be disadvantaged
by increasing performance intensity of aid.
Proposition 5 (Poor Recipients) Poor aid recipient countries are least likely to increase measurement
noise in governance in response to performance intensive aid. Further, under convex adjustment costs,
optimal performance intensity of aid rises even in the presence of rising governance noise, but not for poor
countries.
Proof. Given (20), that the poorest countries are least likely to increase measurement noise follows from
∂E{ε∗}
∂β =
(Kα−θ)[4λξ+φ2(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)
2]−4ϑλφ(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)
[4λξ−φ2(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)
2]
2 < 0 for K<
h
4ϑλφ(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)
4λξ+φ2(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)
2 + θ
i1/α
,s u c h
that only countries with capital stock in excess of a minimum threshold level respond to the performance
intensity of aid by increasing governance noise. Under convex donor agency cost, the greater the expected
measurement error (E (ε)) of pure underlying eﬀort (e) by means of the governance proxy (g) on the part
of the donor agency, the higher the optimal performance intensity of the benevolent donor agency, provided
only that the threshold level of capital K>
³
2λφ
U
εfε(ε)dε(γ−2ψ
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)
2φ2 U
ε2fε(ε)dε+4λψ + θ
2
´1/α
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under (22), such that
∂E{β∗}
∂ε = −2φ
(θ−2Kα)(φ2[
U
εfε(ε)dε]
2+2λψ)−4λφ
U
εfε(ε)dε(2ψ
U
μfμ(μ)dμ−γ)
[2φ2[
U
εfε(ε)dε]
2−4λψ]
2 ≷ 0 for K ≷
³
2λφ
U
εfε(ε)dε(γ−2ψ
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)
2φ2 U
ε2fε(ε)dε+4λψ + θ
2
´1/α
.
The result is surprising, since under performance intensity of aid the aid recipient has an incentive
to respond by increasing both constituent components of the governance measure - eﬀort and measure-
ment error. The return on true eﬀort is certainly higher than on governance noise (simply compare ∂Y/∂e
and ∂Y/∂ε) - but this is so for both poor and richer aid recipients, and indeed increases in the size of
the capital stock. The reason for the result is instead that at very low levels of capital, the return on
eﬀort is relatively low (due to the scale eﬀect on eﬀort returns in capital), such that equilibrium eﬀort
will be correspondingly low. But under these conditions, it follows that in fact the return on gover-
nance noise may turn out to be negative, conditional on the cost structure attaching to the generation
of governance noise. Since ∂Y/∂ε = φ
¡
β +
R
μfμ (μ)dμ
¢
E {e∗} − ϑ − 2ξ
R
εfε (ε)dε, ∂Y/∂ε < 0 for
E {ε∗} >
£
φ
¡
β +
R
μfμ (μ)dμ
¢
E {e∗} − ϑ
¤
/2ξ. Under rising capital stock endowment, the risk of nega-
tive returns from governance error diminishes, and both sources of increased aid ﬂow are exploited actively.
Given the lower risk of exploitation of governance measurement error by poor countries, it follows that the
aid donor can increase reliance on performance intensity of aid for poor countries.
Second, given only a minimum level of donor agency eﬃciency, governance noise itself may come to
increase optimal eﬀort on the part of the aid recipient.
Proposition 6 (Slippage 1: Donor Information Asymmetry) Governance shocks raise optimal eﬀort
and governance if donor agency eﬃciency lies above a threshold level. Increased variance in measurement
error (σ2
ε), leaves optimal recipient country eﬀort unaﬀected, and lowers recipient country optimal governance
levels .
Proof. Speciﬁcally, positive governance shocks, (ε>0): (a) raise optimal eﬀort if E (μ) > −φβ;a n d( b )r a i s e
optimal governance if ε> θ−Kα
2φ(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ). Given (17),
∂E{e∗}
∂ε =
φ(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)
2λ
>
≤ 0 for
R
μfμ (μ)dμ
>
≤ −
φβ. Given (18),
∂E{g∗}
∂ε =
2φ(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ)ε+(Kα−θ)
2λ
>
< 0 for ε
>
<
θ−K
α
2φ(β+
U
μfμ(μ)dμ). On the impact of error
variance, from (17),
∂E{e∗}
∂σ2
ε =0 , and given (18),
∂E{g∗}
∂σ2
ε < 0.
Thus optimal eﬀort levels will respond to governance shocks only if expected donor agency ineﬃciency
does not fall below −φβ, though since −φβ < 0,t h e r ei sa ne ﬀort response from the aid recipient even
where the donor agency is ineﬃcient (in the sense that E (μ) < 0). Moreover, the greater expected donor
agency eﬃciency, the more readily will any given governance shock exceed the critical size required for
optimal governance to rise. The positive implication for the performance intensive policy intervention in
the presence of measurement error, is that even though there may be an attempt on the part of the aid
recipient to raise the noise in the measured performance dimension in response to the performance intensity
of intervention (i.e. to raise ε in response to β, see Proposition 3), as long as the eﬃciency of the aid donor
meets minimum threshold levels, increased governance shocks will themselves come to raise optimal eﬀort on
the part of the aid recipient. By way of corollary, note that the minimum threshold level that donor agency
eﬃciency has to meet is more readily attained the stronger the performance intensity of the aid (β).
The result is thus the counter-intuitive one that the noise response on the part of the aid recipient is of
diminished signiﬁcance from the perspective of the aid donor, because the noise response may reinforce the
desirable eﬀects on eﬀort and governance in the aid recipient. The requirement for realizing this virtuous
linkage is that donor agency eﬃciency meets a minimum threshold level - strengthening the importance of
eﬀective executive dispensation of aid.
We conclude this section by noting that for purposes of policy, the most signiﬁcant results are that
performance intensity of aid allocation does raise noise in the governance measure. However, the incentive
to raise eﬀort is likely to be stronger than that to raise noise, and the incentive to raise noise is likely to
be weakest in the poorest aid recipients. Finally, provided that the donor agency is suﬃciently eﬃcient,
measurement error itself will serve to raise optimal eﬀort in the aid recipient. While monitoring noise inPerformance Intensive Policy Intervention 14
the governance measure of the aid recipient may be important for the aid donor, self-monitoring also carries
important beneﬁts.
5. A Tension Between the Decisions of Aid Donors and Recipients
Aid is not granted under static conditions. The state of the world is subject to shocks, which may come
to alter the decision problem of both the aid recipient, and its donor, irrespective of the mechanism with
which aid is dispensed.
An obvious comparative static concern in our context is therefore to detail the behavioural response of
aid recipients and donors to changes in the underlying decision parameters and variables. In doing so, it is
particularly useful to note any diﬀerentials in the behavioural response on the part of the two types of agent.
In doing so, we note that the model, despite its emphasis on circumstances that have eliminated any
misalignment of incentives between aid donors and recipients, suggests that aid donors are likely to rely
on performance intensity of aid precisely where such a reliance is least successful. In doing so, they are
responding to their benevolent objective of improving the lot of the aid recipient - when things get worse in
the aid recipient, the donor attempts to compensate by a more aggressive aid dispensation. Unfortunately
what lurks for the benevolent aid donor in its home constituency, is the threat of accusations of wastage of
resources on lost causes.
Be begin by noting that:
Proposition 7 (Recipient vs. Donor) Optimizing benevolent aid donors are most likely to increase re-
liance on performance intensity of aid, where the performance intensity of aid is least likely to have a strong
impact in the aid recipient. This holds with respect to the cost structure of eﬀort in the aid recipient, cor-
ruption in the aid recipient, productive capacity in the aid recipient, and with respect to the eﬃciency of the
donor agency.
Proof. We proceed sequentially. First, there is a negative eﬀort and governance response in optimizing re-
cipient countries to increased eﬀort costs (λ,θ), but an increasing cost structure of eﬀort (dθ > 0), raises the
optimal performance intensity of aid for the benevolent donor agency: given (17, 18),
∂E{e∗}
∂θ ,
∂E{e∗}
∂λ <
0 and
∂E{g∗}
∂θ ,
∂E{g∗}
∂λ < 0; given (22), (23),
∂E{β∗}
∂θ > 0. Second, there is a positive eﬀort and gov-
ernance response in optimizing recipient countries to a decrease in corruption - or any other improve-
ment in the direct eﬀectiveness of aid (φ). Under ﬁxed donor agency costs, rising corruption in the
recipient country (dφ < 0), raises the optimal performance intensity of aid for the benevolent donor
agency. Given
R
εfε (ε)dε > 0, under convex donor agency costs, rising corruption in the recipient coun-
try (dφ < 0), raises the optimal performance intensity of aid for the benevolent donor agency, provided
K<
h
φ
R
εfε (ε)dε
³
2
R
μfμ (μ)dμ −
φ
U
εfε(ε)dε
4λψ +
γ
ψ
´
+ θ
2
i1/α
. Given (17, 18),
∂E{e∗}
∂φ > 0,
∂E{g∗}
∂φ > 0.
Given (23),
∂E{β∗}
∂φ < 0. From (22),
∂β∗
∂φ
=
2φ
U
εfε (ε)dε
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εfε (ε)dε − 4λγ
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εfε (ε)dε
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μfμ (μ)dμ −
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εfε(ε)dε
4λψ +
γ
ψ
´
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2
i1/α
,g i v e n
R
εfε (ε)dε > 0. Third, the greater
the productive capacity of the recipient country (K), the greater the incentive in optimizing recipient coun-
tries for increased eﬀort and good governance. The greater the productive capacity of the aid recipient (K),
t h el o w e rt h eo p t i m a lp e r f o r m a n c ei n t e n s i t yof the benevolent donor agency. Given (17, 18),
∂E{e∗}
∂K > 0,
∂E{g∗}
∂K > 0. Given (22), (23),
∂E{β∗}
∂K < 0. Finally, gains in bureaucratic eﬃciency on the part of the
donor agency (μ), generate a higher optimal level of eﬀort and governance in the optimizing aid recipient.
T h eg r e a t e rt h ei n e ﬃciency of aid delivery (dμ < 0), the greater the optimal performance intensity of the
benevolent donor agency. Given (17, 18),
∂E{e∗}
∂μ > 0,
∂E{g∗}
∂μ > 0. Given (22), (23),
∂E{β∗}
∂μ < 0.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 15
In the case of the donor agency, while these results may appear counterintuitive, they are a direct
consequence of assuming that the division of power in the donor country is successful in rendering the donor
agency benevolent: interested purely in maximizing the recipient country output subject to its own cost of
operation. Any factor that serves to lower income in the aid recipient, be this increased cost of eﬀort, the
presence of corruption which serves to divert aid ﬂows,31 low productive capital capacity to generate output,
or where the aid donor is itself ineﬃcient in channeling aid to the intended recipients, triggers a counter-
response which attempts to reverse the negative impact on aid recipient productivity by strengthening the
incentive eﬀect of performance intensive aid.
Conversely, the aid recipient responses are a consequence of constraints on the behaviour of the aid
recipient. Thus the net eﬀect of incentives to improve eﬀort and governance through performance intensity of
aid, will depend crucially on how costly (λ,θ) it is for the potential aid recipient to respond. Where substantial
cost barriers are present, observed eﬀects may be disappointing. Similarly, the presence of corruption in the
aid recipient will limit the incentive eﬀects of the performance intensity of aid, while to the extent that
improved governance leads to gains in anti-corruption activity through transparency and accountability
say, the incentive eﬀect of performance intensity of aid on eﬀort and governance is enhanced.32 For the
impact of the donor agency eﬃciency, since the aid recipient cannot distinguish between the true underlying
performance intensity of aid (β), and the extent of the slippage that may result from bureaucratic ineﬃciency
(μ), an increase in either performance intensity or donor agency eﬃciency will elicit an eﬀort/governance
response. Conversely, bureaucratic ineﬃciency in the donor agency lowers optimal eﬀort and governance
in the recipient country. Finally, the greater the productive capacity of the aid recipient, the greater the
opportunity cost of not ensuring the realization of the output potential through poor eﬀort/governance.33
As i g n i ﬁcant corollary to follow is that the incentive eﬀect that performance intensity of aid carries, wanes
with rising productive capacity in the recipient country. The opportunity cost to poor eﬀort renders the
existence of poor eﬀort/governance less likely independently of the performance intensity of aid.
The results of this section help demonstrate why the activities of donor agencies may often face consid-
erable public disaﬀection in donor country voting constituencies. Attempts to increase aid ﬂows to recipient
countries through changed performance intensity of aid (since this is the only means at the disposal of the
donor agency to change aid ﬂows) are targeted to recipients with low productive capacity, where eﬀort re-
sponses may be slow because costly, where corruption is rife, and to counter the ineﬃciency of the donor
agency.34
It is not diﬃcult to understand that this may seem perverse to voters - with the actions of government
agencies appearing hell-bent on maximizing budgets precisely where this appears custom made to be wasteful
in the sense of being targeted at circumstances where expenditure is known to be relatively ineﬀective. In
fact, in the current case we have demonstrated that such apparently perverse behaviour is precisely the
result of benevolent action on the part of the donor agency - or rather the use of performance intensive aid
precisely when a strong incentive is needed to secure a response on the part of the recipient, which in turn
of course holds for those recipients that are corrupt, ineﬃcient, and have low productive capacity.
But the donor agency response is also perverse in a deeper sense. A number of those factors that are
most suited to raising the optimal level of governance, are precisely those that lower the donor’s likelihood
of encouraging governance through performance intensity of aid. Strictly these include cost of eﬀort, the
productive capacity of the aid recipient, the eﬃciency of aid delivery, while corruption and measurement error
also feature. The reassuring aspect of this ﬁnding is that the introduction of performance intensity of policy
intervention does not lead to the abandonment of the least advantaged. Provided that the executive authority
31The only nuance here is that in the presence of convex donor agency costs, where the donor agency is ineﬃcient (in the
sense of
U
μfμ (μ)dμ < 0), increased corruption in the aid recipient may lower performance intensity of aid.
32Note that this captures in some measure the impact of allowing δ (g).
33Performance intensity of aid will also increase the marginal product of aid recipient country capital stock, since from (1),
∂Y/∂K > 0. The implication is that the aid recipient country thus has an added incentive to improve growth performance, by
increasing the return on capital stock at the margin, hence the level of the optimal capital stock and output.
34This leaves open the question of whether the response by the donor agency is ex post or ex ante.T h eex post response to
the detection of mischief of toughening up the performance criterion may be the more realistic, since it is not easy to see how
the donor agency would know knows ex ante how much the recipient will cheat.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 16
(here the donor agency) is benevolent in the sense of being focussed on the intended policy outcome rather
than its own strategic interest, it proves to employ performance intensive intervention more aggressively for
aid recipients that are weak in the sense of facing high cost of eﬀort, low productive capacity, and corruption,
than for recipients that are strong in these dimensions.
6. The Impact of Aid Recipient Own Productivity
The analysis thus far has ignored variability in the aid recipient’s own productivity. The question we
face now is to what extent the level of eﬃciency in production by the aid recipient impacts on the decision
problems of both the recipient and the donor agency.
Consider the sensitivity of optimal governance choices to δ - that is the impact of the fourth policy
slippage identiﬁed in the formulation of this paper’s problem.35 Thus far we have proceeded under the
assumption that δ =1 , for both recipient and donor decision problems. For generality we now consider
0 ≤ δ<1.
T h ec a s ef o rδ =0follows immediately from equation (16), as:
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φ
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All propositions continue to hold, with two exceptions. Under δ =0the scale eﬀect in own resources identiﬁed
by proposition (7) is no longer present, since own eﬀort is unable to impact on output. The incentive to
improve output by increasing the impact of the own capital stock is therefore eliminated, and improvements
in governance are only able to impact on ﬁnal output by altering the direct eﬀectiveness of aid. Second, for
governance shocks (ε), the threshold level that the positive governance shock has to meet for the optimal
level of governance to increase rises, modifying proposition (6). The increase in the threshold level arises
since the positive pay-oﬀ that attaches to eﬀort due to the own scale of production (Kα) is eliminated under
δ =0 .
This leaves the possibility of 0 <δ<1. Table 1 reports numeric solutions for g∗ under the parame-
terization, θ =1 , λ =0 .001, α =1 , φ =1 , K =1 , E (ε)=1 , E (μ)=0 .36 Figure 2 provides a visual
representation. Four core implications stand out from the evidence. We summarize:
Proposition 8 (Own Eﬀort) H i g h e s ta b s o l u t el e v e l so fg o v e r n a n c ee m e r g ew h e r eb o t hp e r f o r m a n c ei n -
tensity of aid (β → 1), and the own eﬀort of the recipient country is strong (δ → 1). Speciﬁcally: (a.)
Increasing eﬀectiveness of recipient eﬀort as measured by δ, is associated with increases in the optimal level
of governance. (b.) The impact of the performance intensity of aid (β), on the optimal governance level g∗,
becomes proportionately weaker, the stronger the eﬀectiveness of recipient own eﬀort (δ). (c.) The impact
of increasing eﬀectiveness of recipient eﬀort (δ) on the optimal governance level g∗, becomes proportionately
weaker, the stronger the performance intensity of aid (the greater is β).
35We restict the analysis to the 0 <δ≤ 1 range, on the presumption that increasing returns in eﬀort alone are not feasible.
Empirical evidence corroborates.
36Strictly, the polynomial leading to the governance solution has a second equilibrium at zero governance. Since this implies
an absence of all eﬀort on the part of the recipient of aid, hence no production or income, we exclude this case as economically
trivial. Note further that under α =1 , δ>0, we necessarily face increasing returns. However, under α<1 the substantive
conclusions noted below are not aﬀected.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 17
Under dδ > 0,r e t u r n st oo w ne ﬀort increase since the marginal product of capital is raised. The increased
incentive to raise eﬀort maps into improved governance.
The proportional impact of increasing δ is illustrated by the ratio of g∗ under β =1to g∗ under β =0 .1,
ﬁve times higher under δ =0 .001 than under δ =1 . The intuition is straightforward. Where own eﬀort
is productive, the aid recipient has an incentive to increase eﬀort (mapped into governance) independently
of the incentive provided by the performance intensity of aid. While the incentive provided by aid does
serve to further raise optimal governance, the impact is proportionately less dramatic than in the case of
unproductive own eﬀort.
∂2g∗
∂δ2 < 0.
The implication is that where own eﬀort is unproductive (δ → 0), increased performance intensity of
aid (dβ > 0) is proportionately at its most eﬀective, given the negative impact of δ → 0 on the marginal
product of capital. Figure 2 illustrates the increase in optimal governance over the 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 range for
our parameterization for dβ > 0. Raising income through aid by means of governance compliance, is the
most immediate means of improving income. Reliance on performance intensity of aid may thus be desirable
precisely where the aid recipient has low own eﬀort productivity.
Recall that δ → 1 carries with it the likelihood of increasing returns to scale. More plausible may be
0 <δ≤ 1 − α. The preceding discussion suggests that this may well enhance the incentive eﬀects of the
performance intensity of aid.
The proportional impact of increasing β is illustrated by the ratio of g∗ under δ =1to g∗ under
δ =0 .001, ﬁve times higher under β =0 .1 than under β =1 . Intuition here follows from the fact that
strong performance intensity of aid (β → 1) already provides an incentive to good governance, such that
increases in the productivity of own eﬀort (dδ > 0), while raising optimal governance further, have a smaller
proportional impact.
Dramatic governance improvements occur under the combination of own eﬀort eﬀectiveness (δ → 1), and
performance intensity of aid (β → 1).
One policy response that follows is that aid should incentivize good governance - but help in improving
the impact of own eﬀort would help to increase the desired pay-oﬀ.37 Performance intensity of aid targeted
directly at improving governance, while useful in raising governance particularly under low own eﬀort pro-
ductivity, alone does not capture the full potential gains in eﬀort and governance. This is achieved only
when own eﬀort productivity is raised also, opening a role for aid providing technical assistance in addition
to performance intensive aid.
Propositions 8 serves to demonstrate the importance of the eﬀort productivity channel, ∂Y
∂δ
∂δ
∂g
∂g
∂e,n o t e di n
the discussion following Proposition 1. Maximum aid impact is reserved for the use of performance intensive
aid jointly with technical assistance.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
These ﬁndings lead to a conjecture concerning the use of performance measures in policy: performance
intensity of aid maximizes its impact under conditions where it is supplemented by technical assistance to
improve the eﬀectiveness of own eﬀort by the aid recipient.
7. The Impact of Adjustment Costs
Thus far the analysis has been essentially static. Linearity in the time rate of change of decision variables
has ensured that the decision problems have been degenerate in the dynamic sense.
This is clearly an abstraction in the current context. The analysis thus far has employed a cost structure
for the aid recipient which reﬂected the impact of eﬀort, with CR,e > 0,C R,ee > 0.W en o t e di nt h ep r e c e d i n g
discussion that the adoption of performance intensity of aid had an impact on the level of governance that the
optimizing aid recipient would adopt, deriving this implication in terms of comparative statics. Yet changing
37Objective of the aid would be to provide technical assistance in order to raise the productivity of own eﬀort in the aid
recipient country. This might take the form of technology transfers, human capital transfers, training assitance, etc.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 18
the level of eﬀort (and by inference governance) in the aid recipient country is unlikely to be costless.38 To
reﬂect this, we now posit not only that CR,e > 0,C R,ee > 0, but also that C
R,
•
e > 0,C
R,
•
e
•
e > 0.
By contrast, for the donor agency to alter the degree of performance intensity of aid, dβ, is essentially
costless. Perhaps somewhat less plausibly, we also take the cost of altering the aid budget, dk, to be zero.
While budget debates are often notoriously vexed, relative to altering governance structures such costs are
negligible. This explains our choice of emphasizing the adjustment costs of the aid recipient.
The structure of the decision problem remains unaltered from (2). Given the additional argument in the
cost function, however, the Euler equation now comes to reﬂect the time rate of change of the governance
variable also. In general speciﬁcation we have:
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−
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∂e
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The structure of the Euler remains symmetrical to that faced by the aid recipient in the absence of adjustment
costs, except for the appearance of the marginal cost of eﬀort change impact d
dt
³
∂CR
∂
•
e
´
.T h eo p t i m a lt i m e
path in eﬀort, and intertemporal level of eﬀort thus requires that the marginal cost of eﬀort change must be
compensated by the net direct marginal return on eﬀort and the marginal impact of aid on eﬀort.
Again, for purposes of illustration, suppose that in addition to (9) through (14), we have:
CR (e)=θe+ λe2 + ϕ
•
e + ζ
•
e
2
+ ϑε + ξε2, θ,λ,ϕ,ζ,ϑ,ξ>0, (27)
and let e(0) = e0,w i t ht h eﬁxed time horizon T, e(T) free. The Euler equation ﬁrst order condition is now:
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giving the intertemporal equilibrium:
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and optimal time path:
e∗ (t)=A1 exp
%
1
2
#
ρ +
2
v
ρ2 +
4λ
ζ
$&
t + A2 exp
%
1
2
#
ρ −
2
v
ρ2 +
4λ
ζ
$&
t + e (30)
s.t. e∗ (0) = e0
0=

ϕ
ε
+
2ζ
ε2
•
g

exp[−ρT]
with A1,A 2, two arbitrary constants.
It follows that:
Proposition 9 (Non-monotinicity) The general class of optimal time paths in eﬀort, e∗ (t),i sn o n -
monotone in time.
38In terms of more general policy considerations, nor are changes in educational systems, health systems, or the provision of
federal services costless.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 19
Proof. Since:
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This is potentially of considerable practical policy importance. The implication is that the optimal time
path in eﬀort on the part of the aid recipient is not only non-linear, but non-monotonic. Thus it is feasible
that the optimal time path of adjustment, on the part of an aid recipient that is attempting to increase the
optimal intertemporal level of eﬀort in responding to the performance intensity of aid, is such that eﬀort
initially gets worse, before it gets better. Figure 3 provides an illustration for our example - with eﬀort
falling before rising to the intertemporal equilibrium.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.
The diﬃculty for the donor agency, and the legislature, is that it may appear as if the policy is failing,
immediately after implementation. Even though things are bound to improve, and improve substantially, it
appears as if the policy not only brings about changes in eﬀort, and by extension (given 1) in governance,
but in precisely the wrong direction. What is more, the case in which things gets worse before they improve
is very diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate from that in which things collapse. For those who are on the receiving end
of the policy intervention risk aversion is easy to understand and sympathize with. The net result is easy
pickings for critics - high risk for the policy proponent.
8. Conclusions and Evaluation
Performance intensity of aid has three core features.
In this paper analysis proceeded under the abstraction of three agents, a legislature that allocates re-
sources to an aid budget and speciﬁes the criterion against which the performance of the aid recipient is to
be measured, an aid donor agency that sets the intensity of the performance target, and an aid recipient
(country) that chooses the optimal level of performance in the allocative measure chosen by the aid donor.
Considerable slippage is introduced into the process of aid delivery. The model incorporated ﬁve distinct
sources of slippage in policy delivery. First, the performance measure of interest to the aid donor is observed
with measurement error. Second, the eﬃciency of the aid donor is also subject to both positive and negative
shocks. Third, the recipient country may be subject to corruption in the aid transmission process. Fourth
own eﬀort of the aid recipient may be more or less eﬃcient. Finally, adjusting the optimal level of optimal
eﬀort and by extension governance in the aid recipient is subject to adjustment costs.
Our simple model has demonstrated that performance intensity of aid generates incentive eﬀects, such that
the optimal level of eﬀort and governance in the aid recipient will increase under strengthening performance
intensity of aid. In addition, improving eﬀort and governance in the aid recipient in turn was shown to
lead to increased budgetary allocations to aid in the legislature that allocates aid resources. Performance
intensity of aid thus has fundraising eﬀects.
While performance intensity of aid under imperfectly observed eﬀort also increases measurement noise,
the incentive to increase true eﬀort is likely to be stronger than that to increase noise in the governance
measure. Moreover, the incentive to increase measurement noise is weakest for the poorest countries, and
provided that the donor agency is suﬃciently eﬃcient, measurement error itself will serve to raise optimalPerformance Intensive Policy Intervention 20
eﬀort in the aid recipient. While monitoring noise in the governance measure of the aid recipient may be
important for the aid donor, self-monitoring thus also carries important beneﬁts.
Equally, however, it is useful to bear in mind the caveats that the model has identiﬁed, especially since
they emerge under maximally favourable conditions to the policy intervention: aligned incentives between
aid donor and aid recipient.
First, the eﬀectiveness of the performance intensity of aid appears to depend strongly on the degree of
eﬃciency of own eﬀort in the aid recipient country.
This ﬁnding leads us to a ﬁrst conjecture concerning the use of performance measures in policy: perfor-
mance intensity of aid maximizes its impact under conditions where it is supplemented by technical assistance
to improve the eﬀectiveness of own eﬀort by the aid recipient.
Second, despite its emphasis on circumstances that have eliminated any misalignment of incentives be-
tween aid donors and recipients, the model suggests that aid donors are likely to rely on performance intensity
of aid precisely where such a reliance is least successful. In doing so, they are responding to their benevolent
objective of improving the lot of the aid recipient - when things get worse in the aid recipient, the donor
attempts to compensate by a more aggressive aid dispensation. This is true with respect to aid recipient
costs, corruption, productive capacity, and the donor agency’s own eﬃciency.
These results lead us to a second conjecture concerning the use of performance measures in policy:
since the benevolent donor agency responds to negative shocks to the net income of aid recipient countries
by increasing the performance intensity of aid, it may face considerable populist pressures at home. The
left will abuse it for castigating the poor. The right for throwing good money at lost causes. Yet the
intervention is simply a technically optimal attempt to improve the net welfare of the aid recipient. It is
neither punishment, nor waste.
Finally, a consideration of the dynamics of adjustment in eﬀort and by inference governance, identiﬁed
a further source for concern in implementing performan c em e a s u r e si np o l i c y .T h ep r e s e n c eo fa d j u s t m e n t
costs in eﬀort (hence governance) for the aid recipient introduces the possibility of optimal time paths in
eﬀort that are non-monotone. The implication is that eﬀort, on the optimal time path of adjustment to a
new higher level of eﬀort, may be such as to initially make things worse before they improve.
Our third and ﬁnal conjecture concerning the use of performance measures in policy is therefore that
policy makers face risks in their implementation. The problem for the policy maker is that it may appear as
if the policy is failing, immediately after implementation. Policy designed to improve eﬀort and governance
does produce change - but in the wrong direction. Even though things are bound to improve, and improve
substantially, this may be both diﬃcult to sell, and perhaps even more importantly diﬃcult to distinguish
from cases where things really are going wrong. The bottom line: easy pickings for critics - high risk for the
policy proponent.
What remains is that performance intensity of aid works. It simply is no panacea.
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  Conceptual Stage 3: Legislature: Empirical Stage 1: 
 
1.  Defines: objective of aid = max YR ; need for performance intensity of some sort, β 
 
2.  Chooses: size of aid = k 
 
3.  Immune to strategic action by Executive. 
Absence of strategic action by recipient allows Legislature to condition 
choice of optimal k* on optimal choices of β*, g* by Executive & Recipient. 
Conceptual Stage 2: Executive: Empirical Stage 2: 
 
1.  Accepts: max YR, β 
 
2.  Chooses: level of β; what β loads = g 
 
3.  Defines: the criterion for performance intensity = β 
 
4.  Immune to strategic action by Recipient. 
Absence of strategic action by recipient allows Executive to condition choice 
of optimal β* on the optimal choice of g* by Recipient. 
Conceptual Stage 1: Recipient: Empirical Stage 3: 
 
 
1.  Accepts: g criterion, level of β 
 
2.  Chooses: e, ε 
 
3.  Defines: the performance intensive dimension g 
Figure 1: The Conceptual Structure of the ProblemPerformance Intensive Policy Intervention 24
Figure 2: Variation of g∗ in δ,o v e ra l t e r n a t eβ-parameterizations. θ =1 , λ =0 .001, α =1 , φ =1 , K =1 ,
E (ε)=1 , E (μ)=0 .Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 25
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Figure 3: Illustration of optimal non-monotone adjustment in eﬀort: α =1 , β =1 , θ =1 .5,   =0 , ε =1 ,
λ =0 .001, δ =0 .001, φ =1 , ρ =0 .1, ϕ =1 , ζ =0 .9.Performance Intensive Policy Intervention 26
δ β = 0.1 β = 0.3 β = 0.5 β = 0.7 β = 0.9 β = 1
g∗
max
g∗
min
1 549.901 649.901 749.901 849.901 949.901 999.901 1.82
0.9 304.001 397.301 492.101 587.801 684.201 732.601 2.41
0.8 190.001 279.601 372.401 467.001 562.701 610.801 3.21
0.7 131.001 219.401 312.401 407.601 504.101 552.601 4.22
0.6 97.901 187.001 281.401 377.901 475.401 524.501 5.36
0.5 78.201 169.201 265.301 363.101 461.601 511.001 6.53
0.4 66.101 159.501 257.101 355.801 455.001 504.701 7.64
0.3 58.601 154.401 253.101 352.401 452.001 501.901 8.56
0.2 54.101 151.701 251.201 350.901 450.701 500.601 9.25
0.1 51.401 150.501 250.301 350.201 450.201 500.101 9.73
0.001 50.001 150.001 250.001 350.001 450.001 500.001 10.00
g∗
max
g∗
min 11.00 4.33 3.00 2.43 2.11 2.00
Table 1: Optimal governance under alternative eﬀort eﬀectiveness (delta) and aid incentive (beta) parame-
terizations. Scaling is arbitrary.